Previous studies of event returns surrounding bank mergers show that banks gain value in megamergers and additional value when they absorb in-market competitors. A portion of these gains has been traced to the increased bargaining power of banks vis-à-vis regulators and other competitors. We demonstrate that increased bargaining power of megabanks adversely affects loan customers of the acquired institution. Wealth losses are greater when loan customers are credit-constrained, the loan customer is smaller, or the acquisition is an in-market deal. These findings reinforce complaints that the ongoing consolidation in banking has unfavorably affected the availability of credit for smaller firms and especially capitalconstrained firms.
A relationship customer is one that enjoys a history of successful contacts with a bank. Following Belgian bank mergers, Degryse, Masschelein, and Mitchell (2003) find that target customers are more likely than acquirer customers to have their relationships terminated with their bank. These effects are more pronounced for smaller customers with no alternate lending relationships. In Italy, Sapienza (2002) finds that, contract interest rates on bank loans fall when banks with small shares of the local banking market combine. The contrary result is observed for mergers of large Italian banks. This differential finding for large and small bank mergers is consistent with the joint hypothesis that economies of scale exist only for very small banks and that, only when markets are competitive, are merger benefits shifted into loan rates.
These findings are consistent with studies that indicate that at the margin, after banks reach a threshold asset size, they channel an increasing proportion of the lending to large firms. This pattern implies that megabank mergers threaten to disrupt the availability of credit to small businesses. Studies by Strahan and Weston (1998) and Berger, Saunders, Scalise, and Udell (BSSU, 1998) support these concerns. Strahan and Weston find that, as a proportion of bank assets, small-business lending increases only when the merging banks are both small, while mergers between medium and large institutions do not noticeably move this proportion. BSSU find that small-business lending increases following a merger of small banks, but decreases when large banks combine.
A 2004 survey by the Association of Finance Professionals manifests similar concerns in the United States. Nearly two-thirds of the surveyed chief financial officers and treasurers at companies with revenues of $1 billion or more said a bank had denied credit or raised loan prices because the corporate executive did not buy additional services. Executives attribute this to the "growing clout and competition in the banking industry that have come with consolidation and the repeal of laws separating the banking and brokerage business" (Sapsford 2004) .
To investigate how the sign of the net effect varies with merger characteristics and customer circumstances, this study estimates whether and how merger announcements for the ten largest domestic U.S. bank mergers between 1991 and 2001 affect the value of intangible customer relationships at target and acquiring banks. On average, the stock prices of established corporate customers show no statistically significant announcement effect. However, once we control for salient merger and customer characteristics, significant effects emerge. These effects are consistent with the hypothesis that megamergers consolidate market power in particular market segments. On average, target customers suffer in all four mergers where the partners show substantial geographic overlap. As predicted by the bargaining-power hypothesis, very large customers are undamaged and smaller customers of targets fare especially badly when the announcement indicates that managers of the target firm are not going to be treated as equal partners. Finally, losses prove most severe for customers that show evidence of being credit-constrained.
The paper has four sections. Section 1 summarizes the economics of bank-customer relationships and lays out some testable hypotheses. Section 2 reviews the construction and properties of our dataset. Section 3 outlines our methods and Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes with a discussion of policy implications and opportunities for future research.
SOURCES AND DISTRIBUTION OF INTANGIBLE VALUE IN BANK-CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIPS
Modern banking theory emphasizes that the many and repeated points of contact a bank has with its established customers generate private information and mutual trust. Diamond's delegated-monitoring hypothesis holds that banks either win access to inside information from good customers or uncover such information through analysis they undertake in the course of supporting and observing their customers' loan and deposit business (Diamond, 1984, Kane and Malkiel, 1965) .
Privileged information and a climate of mutual trust allow a bank to assess and price the risk of lending to a relationship customer more accurately than the bank's competitors can. In principle, abilities or capacities that create such extranormal returns are intangible assets. In each relationship, the relevant intangible asset may be portrayed as a mutual claim to the capitalized value (R) of the reduced opportunity costs. The outcome of a bilateral bargaining process (BP) allocates R partly to the relationship customer (R C ) and partly to the bank (R B ):
Because R requires the cooperation of both parties, equilibrium R C and R B should each be strictly positive to avoid outcomes that would eliminate the counterparty's incentive to renew the relationship.
To derive testable hypotheses about the determinants of the intangible values R C and R B , we can model R and the differences in bargaining power as functions of a series of observable bank, borrower, and merger characteristics that might reasonably be expected to affect their relative bargaining power. Given R, the impact of a megamerger on a customer's R C depends on whether and how particular bank and merger characteristics might alter its bargaining power. The customer's bargaining power increases with its size and the extent to which the importance of the officers that have handled its business in the past promise to survive postmerger reorganization activity and decreases if the merger is expected to curtail the customer's ability to tap alternative sources of credit on fair terms.
DATASET CONSTRUCTION AND DESCRIPTION

Sample Construction
Our sampling procedure imposes four screens. First, we see ourselves as sampling from the universe of loan customers whose banks happened to participate in each of the ten largest combinations of U.S. domestic banks during 1991-2001. In identifying bank relationships, Gande et al. (1997) and Narayanan et al. (2004) include all member banks in a lending syndicate. However, Yasuda (2005) demonstrates that bank relationships are better characterized by considering only lead lenders in the lending syndicate. Following Yasuda, we identify "relationship" customers as firms for which one or both combining banks served as a sole lender or lead lender in a syndicate at the time of the merger announcement using Loan Pricing Corporation's (LPC) Dealscan database.
1
Identifying firms which have outstanding credit facilities with the combining banks in each merger and aggregating over the ten mergers produces 6823 firm observations involving 4718 unique firms.
2 From these observations, we sample only those customers that meet the following data-availability restrictions:
1. have daily returns available on CRSP during and 210 days prior to the announcement window (produces 3667 firm observations); 2. have balance-sheet and income-statement data on Compustat (produces 2677 firm observations); 3. have observations whose SIC code (ϭ6) does not classify them as financial firms (produces 2325 firm observations); 4. have observations that are traded at least 30% of the designated estimation period trading days and whose event returns did not exceed 15% in absolute value (produces the final sample of 2204 firm observations).
Financial companies are eliminated on the grounds that abnormal returns for these customers may be contaminated by changes in their prospects as competitors of the proposed mega-institution. The other sample reductions lessen distortions associated with nonsynchronous trading, the concurrent release of important idiosyncratic information, and potential outliers.
Variable Definitions
Merger and market characteristics. Takeovers raise "issues" of governance, whose resolution can be more or less friendly to target management. As Table 1 indicates, SNL DataSource characterizes six of the ten megadeals as "mergers of equals." In merger-of-equals combinations (MERGE_EQ), it is anticipated that more managers of target banks will survive in important roles than when the target is absorbed unequally. To test whether the preexisting relationship value of target customers is conserved more fully in merger-of-equal combinations, we define the November 2 indicator variable MERGE_EQ, which equals one in merger-of-equal deals and is zero otherwise. Mergers may expand an acquirer's share of existing markets and/or expand its product line or geographic footprint. Microeconomic theory indicates that a sizeable in-market acquisition is likely to enhance a megabank's market power. Seven of the ten megamergers may be described as in-state acquisitions. Four of these show enough market overlap to be designated in-market. INMARKET takes on the value one for customers whose bank engages in an in-market merger; zero otherwise. We classify the other six combinations as either a market expansion (two cases) or a hybrid (four cases) based on the degree of deposit-market overlap. The final column of Table 1 lists states for which the combining banks each previously serviced at least 1% of deposits. Assuming that in individual state banking markets a bank's deposit and loan shares are highly correlated, we define OVERLAP to be a zero-one dummy that equals unity for customers located in states in which both partners have at least 1% of the deposit market. For example, Norwest and Wells Fargo overlapped in Arizona, Nevada, and Texas.
Customer characteristics. The empirical literature provides a guide in proxying for the competitiveness of each customer's funding environment (CREDIT_ CONSTRAINED). In the macroeconomic literature on monetary policy and credit contractions, Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) and Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox (1993) show that small firms and firms with limited access to credit markets are more sensitive to changes in available bank credit. In the merger literature, Strahan and Weston (1998) , Berger et al. (1998) , Karceski, Ongena, and Smith (2005) , and Sapienza (2002) show that firm size is among the best proxies for customer bargaining power. Kanatas and Qi (2003) also identify age. Houston and James (1996) and Detragiache, Garella, and Guison (2000) show that multiple relationships reduce hold-up costs and adverse-selection costs. While size, age, and relationships are important determinants of hold-up costs, Rajan and Zingales (1998) show that a firm must also have a financing need. Consistent with these prior studies, we constructed the following measures: SIZE: Log of asset size (in $million). YRS: Log of number of years that the firm's stock had been trading publicly. MUL_REL: Zero-one dummy variable that equals one only for customers that have multiple banking relationships. PUB_DEBT: Zero-one dummy variable that takes on the value one for corporations with public bonds outstanding. EFN: External Financing Needs (defined as planned investment minus internally generated funding).
Based on the joint findings of the previous literature, we define a corporation as potentially "credit-constrained" when it lies in the less-favorable tail of the distribution of each of the last five variables, that is when:
PUB_DEBT ϭ 0, YRS Ͻ log of 11 years, SIZE Ͻ log of $1 Billion, EFN Ͼ 0, and MUL_REL ϭ 0.
A zero-one dummy variable (CREDIT_CONSTRAINED) assigns a value of one to customers that meet this five-way condition. Table 2 reports the mean value of all variables defined so far for the all-customer sample and for the subsamples of target and acquirer customers.
Sample Description
3 The table also includes information on the median asset size and market capitalization of target, acquirer, and credit-constrained customers. Across the ten mergers, the respective sizes of the customer subsamples are 1016 target-bank customers, 1292 acquirer Variable definitions may be found in the Appendix.
The difference in means is tested using a t-test, and the difference in medians using a Wilcoxon rank sum test.
3. The Appendix describes in a reproducible way how these variables are constructed.
customers, and 104 joint customers (4.7% of the aggregate sample). The number of customers of all kinds is 2204 (ϭ1016 ϩ 1292 Ϫ 104). The six MERGE_EQ combinations account for 75.6% of total customers: 91.0% of target customers and 62.4% of acquirer customers. All but 11 of the joint observations occur in three merger-of-equals combinations: Chemical-Chase, First UnionWachovia, and Fleet-BankBoston. In mergers of equals, joint customers may be better positioned to deal with the new management structure, but they also lose an alternative funding outlet. On the grounds that joint customers have lost an independent relationship, joint customers are pooled with target customers and eliminated from the acquirer subsample. However, except that this makes the subsamples closer in size, our qualitative findings are not sensitive to pooling decisions. 4 In-market mergers account for 32.0% of the target sample and 27.6% of the acquirer sample. Target customers in overlapped markets constitute 10.9% of the target subsample and acquirer customers 8.4% of the acquirer subsample.
Although the means of all five customer characteristics differ significantly between the target and acquirer subsamples, only one merger characteristic (MERGE_EQ) does so at the 1% level. Assuming that customers of banks involved in mergers of equals are similar in their characteristics, when such customers account for 91% of the target subsample but only 62% of the acquirer subsample, average differences in favor of target customers may emerge. Our sample indicates that not only are target customers larger, but with respect to funding needs and alternative credit access, they seem more favorably situated on average than acquirer customers, although the difference in the mean values of CREDIT_CONSTRAINED variable fails to reach statistical significance at the 1% level. Credit-constrained customers, however, are of similar size across both subsamples.
METHODS
Our paper focuses on the effects that megamerger announcements have on the stock price of corporations that have an outstanding loan at either or both of the target bank and its acquirer. For individual customers, a market model is used to estimate and cumulate Day 0 and Day 1 "Abnormal Returns" to arrive at the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR i ). Whether due to projected changes in R or bargaining power, these CARs should capture whatever net effect the merger has on a borrower's R C . To investigate whether the effect is significant, CAR i is regressed upon proxies for the customer's relationship value (R i ) and bargaining power (BP i ).
4. Pooling decisions are unlikely to impart a bias one way or the other. In addition to primarily being customers of banks involved in friendly mergers, joint customers are among the larger customers and by definition are not credit-constrained because they possess an additional relationship. They are unlikely to be adversely affected by the merger whether they are placed in the acquirer or target subsample. As a robustness check, we reran our regressions with a JOINT_CUST dummy. The dummy is always insignificant.
Regression tests seek to approximate the following latent regression equation:
In estimating Equation (2), the joint influence of R i and BP i is proxied by variables that exemplify merger and market characteristics that proxy for the postmerger disposition of target personnel (MERGE_EQ), for the extent to which the acquirers' product line and geographic footprint expand through in-market acquisitions (INMARKET), for deposit overlap (OVERLAP), and for the intensity of the competitive environment in which the customer must meet its financing needs (CREDIT_CONSTRAINED). The last variable combines effects related to a firm's need for financing and its access to credit.
Regression equations presented in our tables are of the form:
Our first strand of testing looks at whether differences exist in the means of CARs across subsamples composed of target and acquirer customers. The second and more important strand uses Equation (3) to conduct two kinds of regression tests. Individual-coefficient t-tests tell us whether we can reject the null hypothesis that some or all of the individual coefficients are zero. Covariance tests investigate whether particular coefficients differ across the customer subsamples. Table 3 presents the two-day mean CARs for all three customer groups. The table also reports these values for each of the individual megamergers.
RESULTS
First-Round Tests
Mean abnormal returns are statistically insignificant for all three customer groups.
5 However, the proportion of CARs that are negative (47% in each case) differs significantly from 50%. No differences in the CARs are observed across the three customer groups.
Target customers are significantly affected in three cases, while effects on acquirer customers are never significant. Target customers benefited in the market-expansion NationsBank/BankAmerica merger, and lost value in the largely in-market mergers of BankAmerica with Security Pacific and Fleet with BankBoston. Table 4 estimates Equation (3) for the three sample groups. Model 1, using the entire customer sample, is our primary model. Controlling for merger and customer 5. Averaging across the mergers-instead of across firms-also produces qualitatively similar results. 6. These results are robust to different market-portfolio construction methods (equally weighted and value-weighted) and to an alternate standardization of abnormal returns (dividing the abnormal return by the standard deviation of the prediction error). The z-statistic is determined as
Regression Tests
where G is the number of positive parameter estimates, N p is the total number of parameter estimates, and P ϭ .50 (the probability of a positive estimate). *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
TABLE 4
Cross-sectional Analysis of Returns The endogenous variable is the percentage cumulative abnormal return, CAR (0,1), for loan customers surrounding the announcement of a bank merger. Variables definitions are specified in the Appendix. t-values are shown in parentheses below each coefficient. *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. characteristics, the model shows that on average no difference emerges between acquirer, target, and joint customers in their response to the merger announcement: the dummy variables TARGET and JOINT_CUST are statistically insignificant. However, the model does show, through the interaction terms and customer-characteristic variables, that the customers' stake in banking megamergers varies with the merger's character and with the customer's economic circumstances. These effects become apparent in Models 2 and 3 run on the target and acquirer customer subsamples, respectively. Target customers have greater explainable crosssection variation than acquirer customers (R-squared of 4.57% for the targets compared to 1.67% for acquirers). Target customers suffer significantly if their bank is not treated as an equal and if they themselves are credit-constrained. Relative to other target customers, credit-constrained customers lost 2.0% of their value where their bank is not treated as an equal.
7 Acquirer customers benefited from strictly inmarket mergers (0.9%), but were harmed if the partners' larger geographic footprints materially overlap (Ϫ1.1%). Differences between the target and acquirer customer subsamples are confirmed through covariance tests involving the interaction terms in Model 1. F-tests reported at the bottom of the table establish that coefficients for the market-overlap, in-market, and credit-constrained indicators differ significantly between the target and acquired subsamples. In Model 1, the positive slope of the SIZE coefficient assures us that, for largeenough size, adverse effects from other circumstances are overshadowed by benefits of size. This is our strongest and most important result. In fact, aggregating across the customer sample as a whole after multiplying each firm's cumulative abnormal return by its market capitalization reveals a $47 billion increase in value for sample firms.
As Models 2 and 3 indicate, the positive coefficient on SIZE obtains significance only for target customers. For a target customer, the breakeven SIZE may be calculated as the value at which the positive impact of SIZE just equals the sum of the Ϫ2.1% intercept and other relevant considerations. Using the coefficients from an unreported regression of target CARs on SIZE, the effect of the negative intercept washes out when SIZE equals about 7.4. This corresponds to a customer asset size of $1.65 billion, which is greater than the $1.5 billion asset size of the median target customer. Because firms represented in the CRSP and Compustat databases from which our target customers are drawn are disproportionately large, it appears that, in the typical megamerger, more than half of target customers suffer some discomfort.
Controlling for size and other characteristics, outstanding public bonds or multiple relationships also result in reduced customer value. This is possibly a reflection 7. The coefficient for TARGET * (1-MERGE_EQ) is Ϫ0.9 and that for TARGET*CREDIT_ CONSTRAINED is Ϫ1.1.
8. Introducing industry indicators in the models awards insignificant coefficients to the 1-digit SIC dummies. However, their inclusion decreases the standard error for the CREDIT_CONSTRAINED variable. Interacting TARGET and ACQUIRER with the constituents of CREDIT_CONSTRAINED as opposed to the composite CREDIT_CONSTRAINED variable supports the aggregation procedure. of the potential for megabanks to use their enhanced bargaining power to reduce the benefits customers previously derived from competing funding sources. As the banking industry continues to consolidate both nationally and globally, it will become increasingly important to size this discomfort and for society to consider explicitly whether and how to protect the interests of small and credit-constrained target customers in megamergers.
SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS
Acquirers absorb all tangible and intangible items on the economic balance sheet of target banks. Intangible items include charters, strategies, managerial skillsets, and-as emphasized here-access to established customers. In any repeat business, customer relationships are important assets. This paper studies whether and when stockholders of customer firms worry about whether, under the new regime, their borrowing capacity might decline or credit terms become more rigorous.
On average in the ten merger deals studied here, acquirer customers fared much better than customers of target banks. In our sample, target customers experienced significantly negative two-day returns in three circumstances. Small credit-constrained corporations lost on average $3 million (or 1.23%) in market cap. In unfriendly and in-market combinations, adverse effects were more common. Stockholders of target customers lost an average of $46 million (0.86%) in unfriendly mergers and $31 million (0.32%) in in-market deals.
9 Although regression analysis puts a finer edge on these differences, they are visible even in the market-value changes individual firms experience.
These findings are worrisome because the consolidation of large U.S. banks shows few signs of stopping. In 2004, Morgan acquired Bank One and Keycorp will join the list of top-ten banks if and when its in-market deal with CharterOne goes through. If bank consolidation intensifies capital constraints for small business, macroeconomic growth may be curtailed. Further, given that smaller companies create the largest portion of new jobs in our economy, our results suggest bank consolidation may adversely affect the job-creating capacity of the small-business sector. For this reason, we urge regulatory officials to investigate whether they can replicate our results across larger samples of post-1990 banking mergers and to place increased emphasis on how acquirers plan to preserve target-bank relationships.
9. To estimate the market-value change for the sector, we take the average of the multiple of CAR times the market capitalization of the customer.
